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More and more of the developing countries are seeking membership in the World Trade 
Organization. One of the consequences of WTO membership is the necessity of competing 
with the "best-in-class" companies in the international marketplace. Unfortunately, many 
developing countries are plagued by archaic bureaucracies, which constitute a major 
impediment to competitiveness, at a time when it is crucial for developing countries to 
create a vibrant private sector in order to assimilate the large numbers of new entrants 
into the workforce. This paper attempts to identify the causes of bureaucracy and the 
ways by which organizations can de-bureaucratize. Although intense competition is by 
far the best prescription for de-bureaucratizing, other strategies must also be pursued 
simultaneously. The economies that will prosper in the future are the ones that will be 
able to re-invent themselves periodically, something that bureaucratic societies find 
difficult to do. 
INTRODUCTION 
As the world evolves into a global economic village, more and more of the developing 
countries are seeking membership in the World Trade Organization (WTO). Even 
countries that currently rely on oil and natural gas revenues are diversifying their 
economy in anticipation of the day when those non-replenishable resources are depleted. 
One of the consequences of WTO membership and the integration into the "global 
economic village," which WTO membership makes possible, is the reality that companies 
of the developing nations will, perforce, have to compete successfully with some of the 
most efficient enterprises in the world. Many of the developing countries are also 
experiencing the largest population growth rates. Hence, developing countries have no 
choice but to create a vibrant private sector, since it is this sector that must absorb the 
young people entering the workforce. Reliance on the public sector to absorb new 
entrants into the workforce is no longer practical because typically the public sector in 
these countries is already saturated. 
Clearly, developing nations wishing to compete effectively in the global marketplace 
should understand and exploit what Porter (1990) calls the national "diamond," which 
consists of the following facets: 
1. Firm strategy, structure and rivalry 
2. Factor conditions (factors of production are the inputs necessary to compete in a given 
industry). 
3. Demand conditions. 
4. Related and supporting conditions (clusters of interconnected firms, suppliers, related 
industries, and specialized institutions in particular fields that are present in particular 
locations). 
It is interesting to note, however, that Porter fails to mention bureaucracy directly as an 
obstacle to productivity, which is the key to competitiveness not only among firms, but 
also among nations. At best one can imply that it is implicitly subsumed under the first 
facet of his "diamond" theory - i.e., firm strategy, structure, and rivalry. Since one of the 
major impediments to efficiency happens to be bureaucracy, which inhibits the efficient 
deployment and utilization of economic inputs, appreciating the need to de-bureaucratize, 
understanding the causes of bureaucracy, and ascertaining the means to de-bureaucratize 
is vital, if developing countries are to prosper in the face of intense international 
competition. Toward those ends, the authors investigate causes of bureaucracy, ways of 
de-bureaucratizing, and the results of debureaucratization in the remainder of the article. 
  
HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE 
When Weber (1947) developed the theory of bureaucracy as an ideal organizational form, 
he could not have anticipated the many dysfunctions that would arise over time as 
attempts were made to implement his ideas; if for no other reason than many aspects of 
Weber's model reflected organizational circumstances of the early twentieth century. 
Indeed, by the 1940's scholars were already providing significant insights into the theory 
of bureaucracy (Merton, 1940; Selznick, 1943 & 1948). By the 1950's and 1960's, the 
many unintended and undesirable consequences of bureaucracy became the focus of 
criticism in academic literature (Gouldner, 1954; Blau, 1966). 
By the 1960's and 1970's, researchers recognized that bureaucracy needed to be treated as 
a continuum. In other words, to what degree are organizations bureaucratized? The Aston 
studies went so far as to distinguish three types of bureaucracies - full bureaucracy, 
workflow bureaucracies, and personnel bureaucracies (Pugh & Hickson, 1976; Pugh & 
Hinings, 1976; Pugh & Payne, 1977). Mintzberg (1983) went on to make another 
important distinction between machine bureaucracy and professional bureaucracy. More 
recently, scholars have looked at bureaucracies as learning organizations (Weick & 
Westly, 1996), analyzed them from the perspective of power and organizational politics 





REASONS TO DE-BUREAUCRATIZE 
Burns & Stalker (1961) observed some time ago that firms organized along bureaucratic 
lines and pursuing innovative business strategies usually do poorly because they are quite 
rigid, and respond slowly to change. On the other hand, the firms that were devoid of 
bureaucratic impediments, known as adhocracies (Mintzberg, 1983) or organic 
institutions (Burns & Stalker, 1961), frequently succeeded in their pursuit of innovative 
business strategies, since they were flexible, fluid and responsive. 
As a result of unprecedented technological change that created the "Information Age" and 
the concomitant knowledge based economies, what is urgently required are nimble 
organizations pursuing innovative business strategies. In like manner, worldwide 
telecommunications has produced a global consumer whose preferences shift more 
frequently than ever before. This too contributes to the increasing rate of change in the 
marketplace. Being able to compete against the best multinationals and transnationals 
requires the ability to adapt quickly to dynamic, even turbulent, economic environments; 
something bureaucratic organizations cannot do. 
While bureaucratic tendencies plague organizations in every country, industrialized 
societies, in response to aggressive international competition, have learned how to 
streamline their private sector while at the same time downsizing the regulatory arm of 
government. The problem, however, is more acute in developing nations because by-and-
large they are still saddled with a very large public sector characterized by antiquated 
bureaucracies. Yet, creating a rapidly expanding and diversified economy in developing 
nations, even those with significant oil and natural gas revenues, often requires 
considerable direct foreign investment; and multinational and transnational firms are very 
reluctant to invest in a country with excessive bureaucratic obstacles. 
Furthermore, bureaucratic societies also limit investment opportunities for their own 
citizens as well, thereby encouraging them to invest abroad. The result is a further 
reduction of the capital available for domestic economic expansion. In a nutshell, it is 
usually the dearth of competition that is largely responsible for bureaucratic tendencies in 
the private sector. However, unnecessary control by government ministries also decreases 
the efficiency of firms in a competitive environment. Clearly, unreasonable controls 
imposed on monopolies and oligopolies by governmental bureaucracies exacerbate the 
situation even further. Thus, it is necessary to minimize governmental controls by de-
bureaucratizing the government ministries first. Otherwise, there is no way of eliminating 





HANDMAIDENS OF BUREAUCRACY AND THE LAW OF UNINTENDED 
CONSEQUENCES 
The tendency of planned economies to exercise control: The preponderance of developing 
countries remain "planned economies," characterized by state directed industries - many 
of them monopolies or oligopolies. Planned economies, however, have a strong tendency 
to exercise control over practically every aspect of the organizations under their purview. 
Consequently, they impose on these organizations excessive regulations and reporting 
requirements that consume precious resources, force the firms to hire more employees, 
deflect the companies from their principal goals, slow everything down and lead to 
unanticipated consequences. Two examples are in order. First, preventing governmental 
units from carrying unspent funds from one fiscal year to the next encourages managers 
to spend money unwisely at the end of the fiscal year, lest next year's budget be reduced 
by the unspent amount. In like manner, line-item budgeting imposed on government 
agencies by regulatory bodies also constrains much-needed managerial discretion. 
Second, since bureaucratic hurdles make it very difficult to get essential work done, 
bribing government officials becomes commonplace, and the resulting corruption 
undermines the public's confidence in their government and their economy. 
Often, an ancillary goal of planned economies is to use the government sector, which 
exercises the aforementioned control, as an instrumentality for reducing unemployment. 
This leads to a vicious cycle - the more regulators, the more bureaucratic hurdles that 
enterprises must confront. Furthermore, since so many unnecessary persons are hired, 
salaries are low out of necessity. This results in two undesirable consequences: (1) 
Attracting the best people becomes difficult; and (2) many people just sit around much of 
the day without real work to do. Logically then, reducing the size of government 
ministries by transferring some government employees to the private sector should 
mitigate the problem somewhat. 
Parkinson's Law and Bureaucracy: C. Northcote Parkinson (1957) observed during 
World War II that "work expands to fill the time allotted for its completion." Every time 
some of his civilian employees in the British Admiralty were drafted into the armed 
services, the remaining ones accomplished the mission just as well. Parkinson eventually 
realized that this was so because of the natural tendency to build empires. Prestige and 
compensation of administrators in bureaucratic organizations are determined, in part, on 
the basis of how many subordinates they employ and the size of their budgets. Therefore, 
they are motivated to hire more employees than they absolutely need and to increase their 
budget by the largest amount they can. 
These observations eventually led Parkinson to conclude that: "The number of 
subordinates increases at a fixed rate regardless of the amount of work produced." When 
this occurs, the "law of diminishing marginal returns" comes into play. In other words, 
the marginal product of an additional employee eventually will be less than the marginal 
product of the previous employee; but the marginal cost of the additional employee will 
be the same or greater. When the marginal cost of an employee exceeds the marginal 
product of that employee, then the firm would be better off without that employee. 
In all likelihood, the truculent turf wars that are constantly fought in bureaucracies, 
especially during periods of budgetary decline, are about size of the respective empires 
and not about business necessity. Since most workers will not just stand around for a 
variety of reasons, they invent activities to keep busy - in other words, occupational 
hobbies. Hence, the remaining employees reporting to Parkinson had little choice but to 
abandon the occupational hobbies and focus on activities that were essential to the 
mission. The exogenous impetus for efficiency in the private sector - that is, the need to 
make a profit or go out of business - is missing in the public sector, thereby making 
government agencies among the most inflexible of organizations (Katz & Kahn, 1978). 
Mischief caused by cheap labor: When labor is relatively inexpensive vis-à-vis capital, it 
is substituted for capital, and vice versa. Consequently, in organizations in developing 
countries with abundant natural resources such as oil and gas, the bureaucratic solution to 
practically any operations problem is hiring more low-paid expatriates. The Gulf States, 
with the availability of cheap labor in the Indian subcontinent and the Philippines, 
constitute an excellent example. 
Several unintended consequences result from such a strategy. First is the tendency to 
devote insufficient attention up front to designing more efficient systems, to improving 
processes and procedures, and to providing more training to current employees. Second, 
inexpensive expatriate labor discourages the local population from working and 
developing the necessary skills and the requisite work ethic. It is not appreciated in this 
part of the world that for every purchased expatriate mind, there is a wasted local mind. 
Under these circumstances, the situation is aggravated by the legal requirement of "local 
sponsorship," whereby business enterprises in a country must be registered in the name of 
a citizen of that country. Third, availability of inexpensive labor has a chilling effect so 
far as introducing "state-of-the-art" technology is concerned. The essential issue is how 
productive the labor is and not how cheap it is. And "state-of-the-art" technology plays a 
large role when it comes to labor productivity. 
Goal displacement and bureaucracy: Students of bureaucracy have observed that the 
displacement of goals by the means of their attainment is a common occurrence in 
bureaucracies and contributes to inefficiency almost as much as Parkinson's law. In a 
dynamic and fluid environment, goals and objectives that once made sense but have 
become obsolete are frequently superseded by more appropriate goals and objectives. 
Yet, the means by which the replaced goals have been attained have become 
institutionalized and occupy the time of organizational members, when they should have 
been discarded as well. To wit, when organizational members in a bureaucratic 
organization are asked: "Why do you do something this way?" They frequently answer: 
"We have always done it this way." The preoccupation in bureaucracies is with form not 
substance, or with the means, not end goals (Katz and Kahn, 1978). 
Consequently, bureaucratic organizations are characterized by rigid rules and regulations 
for practically anything, as anyone who has dealt with bureaucracies can attest. Since 
lower-level employees in bureaucratic organizations lack the authority to make 
exceptions, any unanticipated situation, and there are many, requires top-level 
intervention. Furthermore, employees in bureaucratic organizations are judged on the 
basis of adherence to rules and regulations, thereby further discouraging exceptions no 
matter how logical and/or how important to the efficient and effective operation of the 
organization. To protect themselves, bureaucrats invent an array of forms that have to be 
filled out in a precise manner by customers or clients and require that letters and or 
memoranda be written to justify every decision or action. In organizational vernacular 
this kind of behavior is referred to as c.y.a. or cover your a--. 
  
DIVISION OF LABOR, SPECIALIZATION OF TASK, AND BUREAUCRACY 
Clearly, the application of Adam Smith's principle of "division of labor and specialization 
of task" has played a large part in the ability of industrialized societies to produce a 
veritable cornucopia of goods and services at affordable prices. This principle, however, 
may have been taken to extremes. There are now specialists for the narrowest tasks and a 
surfeit of staff departments, resulting in excess employment and substantial inefficiencies 
due to the coordination problems and "red tape" associated with so many folks making 
demands of all sorts. In addition, the boredom and monotony that result from excessive 
division of labor and specialization of task frequently create serious motivational 
problems for the kind of employees who thrive on interesting and challenging work 
(Dunham and Pierce, 1989). One management scholar observes that: "Over the past 
several decades, fully 10 times as many white collar jobs have been added to the 
workforce of industrial firms as line jobs." This phenomenon has been referred to as 
"white collar bloat." This individual goes on to say: "The important point is that once a 
new function is established, it is rarely disbanded; its original premise is rarely 
considered" (Davis, 1991). 
Of course, most people employed in jobs that are marginal or unrelated to the principal 
mission of the organization are not about to offer them up in the interest of organizational 
efficiency. In fact, they will not even admit that their jobs can be eliminated without 
much harm to the organization. On the contrary, they will in all likelihood try to 
demonstrate to everyone just how indispensable their jobs really are by inventing 
unnecessary processes and procedures, all involving many needless forms for others to 
fill out. In like manner, these folks schedule meetings that consume a great deal of 
valuable time and accomplish very little in return. Many of these meetings take the form 
of briefings. Once vested interests in make-work activities are created, it behooves job 
occupants to corrupt best business practices in the interest of job security. 
A special case of "feather-bedding" is to be found in developing countries. Since the 
indigenous workforce frequently lacks ideal qualifications but needs to be employed 
anyway, expatriate consultants are hired as well to make certain that the job gets done 
properly. Needless to say, this twinning arrangement not only escalates labor costs, but 
forces everything to go through unnecessary channels, with obvious ramifications with 
respect to efficiency. 
  
CURES THAT ARE WORSE THAN THE DISEASE 
The typical bureaucratic response to an employee indiscretion is to put in place a system 
that makes it next to impossible to commit that offense again, without weighing the cost 
of the impropriety to the organization versus the cost and benefit of the control system. 
Many of these proscriptions, in turn, create their own oversight bureaucracy, which 
prevents the kind of discretion so vital to the efficient management of scarce resources by 
requiring permission from multiple sources for minor matters, and filling out a form or 
completing a report for everything. A good example of a cure that has become worse than 
the disease is Civil Service because it has made it so difficult to discipline or remove 
Civil Service members for rule infractions and poor performance. 
Furthermore, some developing economies have established national policies that require 
replacing expatriate workers with nationals on a predetermined time schedule. However, 
once a national is hired, the government bureaucracy makes it next to impossible to 
terminate the employee. Consequently, employers are reluctant to hire nationals, since 
they cannot replace them in case they turn out to be ineffective or trouble makers. 
Clearly, the bureaucratic practice is counterproductive vis-à-vis national policy. 
  
THE BUREAUCRATIC MINDSET 
Unfortunately, the bureaucratic mindset is contagious, and the principal transmission 
mechanism is the reward system through which bureaucratic behavior is reinforced by the 
entire gamut of rewards, while efficiency and innovation are conditioned out of 
employees through the full panoply of sanctions, with role modeling (new employees 
emulating veteran employees), professional continuing education courses (focusing on 
extant ways of doing things), and inertia completing the bureaucratization process. 
Another unintended and undesirable consequence of the bureaucratic mindset is an 
inward orientation rather than an outward orientation. In other words, in a bureaucratic 
organization the needs of the employee come first, not those of the customer. If the 
customer's problem does not fit into the employee's job description, the customer gets the 
royal run-around. In all fairness to bureaucracies, they handle routine matters reasonably 
well. They have a most difficult time processing anything that is even slightly out of the 
ordinary. In order to do so, the atypical situation must be taken to high-level officials. Put 
another way, the employee is always right instead of the customer. Clearly, in a highly 
competitive business, such an attitude will drive away customers very quickly and 




Simon's concept of "bounded rationality" (1957) shed considerable light on why 
managerial decisions do not necessarily conform to the predictions of the rational 
economic model. Whereas Simon focused on imperfect information as the primary reason 
why managers "satisfice" rather than optimize, he ignored the fact that typically the devil 
is in the implementation. Hence, in addition to "bounded rationality," there exists an 
equally important impediment to organizational efficiency that we call "bounded 
discretion," which limits the implementation of sound management decisions. Bounded 
discretion is caused by the sum total of all the bureaupathologies, which deflect energy 
and effort from those activities that really matter. Bureaupathologies reduce managerial 
degrees of freedom and shrink the tradeoff space. In other words, managerial discretion is 
severely restricted by the organizational arteriosclerosis that bureaucracy induces in 
organizations that it infects. 
  
SALIENCY OF SOCIAL TECHNOLOGY 
It is common when thinking of technology to overlook what is referred to as "social or 
management technology." Whereas physical technology is the realm of the scientists in 
their Research & Development laboratories, management technology relates to the 
organizational patterns, financing alternatives, management systems, processes and 
procedures that hold an institution together and permit it to function efficiently or 
otherwise. For example, Japanese management technology quickly converts worldwide 
innovation into high-quality industrial and consumer goods at competitive prices, and 
delivers them to the marketplace on a timely basis. It is this ability that gives the Japanese 
the illusion of being more innovative on the physical technology frontier than they 
actually are, and is largely responsible for the "Japanese Economic Miracle." It is this 
"leading edge" management technology that makes it possible to exploit physical 
technology (Muczyk, 1990). In fact, it was largely the Japanese management challenge 
that compelled U.S. firms to become efficient or file for bankruptcy. 
The opposite of "leading-edge" management technology, however, is bureaucracy. Short 
of exposing every organization and economic activity to the rigors of intense 
competition, is there anything that can be done to make bureaucratic organizations less 
so? The short answer is that the best cure for bureaupathologies is spirited competition 
and lots of it. Nothing comes in as a close second. However, if firms in developing 
countries do not become efficient by the time WTO membership introduces intense 
competition, then numerous companies will go out of business. In the meantime, some 
steps can be taken to increase organizational efficiency, providing the "managerial will" 
is there (Muczyk, 1998, Summer). 
  
 
ONE-STOP SHOPPING AS AN INTERIM SOLUTION 
Firms wishing to do business in most developing countries must go through a myriad of 
agencies and procedures. Clearly, such a prospect discourages not only foreign direct 
investment, but indigenous entrepreneurship as well. Until such time as the economy can 
be de-bureaucratized, developing nations can follow Dubai's example and create one-stop 
shopping centers, whereby a foreign company or a local entrepreneur can take its needs 
to one location, turn them over to a person who has complete mastery of the local 
bureaucracy, pay a reasonable, fee, wait a short time, and return to pick up all the needed 
authorization. 
At least one of Dubai's neighbors adopted the idea. However, the bureaucratic inertia 
resulted in duplicating the form but not the substance. Even though a one-stop shopping 
office was established, clients must still get their own permission from many of the 
government ministries. The net effect was to create one more layer of bureaucracy - the 
one-stop shopping office. 
  
RE-ENGINEERING ORGANIZATIONS 
"Re-engineering" means excising those activities that are unrelated or marginally related 
to the central mission (occupational hobbies), removing redundancies, and creating or 
refining processes through which mission relevant goals and objectives are attained in an 
efficient and effective manner. Re-engineering requires evaluating the value chain and 
eliminating or reducing components that either add no value or very little, while retaining 
and even enhancing those that contribute considerable value. A critical element of re-
engineering is reducing cycle times. For example, many retail businesses in developing 
countries have introduced computers at the point-of-sale, and receipts are printed out by 
these computers. Yet, the sales clerk still fills out by hand the same information on forms 
that predate the computer and are no longer needed. This phenomenon is by no means 
restricted to the retailing sector. 
Downsizing, on the other hand, may or may not be synonymous with re- engineering; 
depending on whether or not the aforementioned issues were considered before 
manpower reductions were made (Muczyk, 1997). 
In other words, re-engineering should be guided by "Occam's Razor" principle, which 
states that the best theory is the simplest one that adequately explains the issue in 
question. That is, the best procedure, system or practice is the one with the minimum 
steps to get the job done in a satisfactory manner. Interestingly enough, Frederick 
Winslow Taylor, the father of "scientific management," applied this principle with 
respect to obtaining the "one best way" to perform a given task. Critical to all re-
engineering efforts are the elements discussed below.  
Often persons responsible for re-engineering organizations begin by asking the wrong 
question first, i.e., "how can we simplify this procedure?" The correct question to ask first 
is: "Do we absolutely need this procedure at all?" 
An excellent first-step to answering the questions mentioned above is activity- based 
costing (ABC)- a systematic method for assigning costs to business activities. First, a 
reasonable number of business activities needs to be defined, and all the costs associated 
with each activity need to be assigned to the appropriate activity. Once this much has 
been accomplished, the activities with their associated costs can be allocated to products, 
processes, customers or vendors. Next, activities need to be assigned priority on the basis 
of cost, with the most expensive activity receiving top priority for scrutiny with respect to 
redundancy, relevancy, and criticality. Last, whenever appropriate, the unnecessary or 
marginal activities are eliminated. 
Another worthwhile approach involves benchmarking the most efficient and effective 
organizations (best-in-class). This is a particularly productive way of gauging the 
appropriate size of headquarters staff, but could be applied to rightsizing practically any 
functional area. 
Part-and-parcel of re-engineering is tradeoff analysis. In a competitive environment, we 
must frequently decide what it is that we will give up in return for getting or keeping 
something; and whether the exchange is worthwhile with respect to the most important 
goals of the organization. The decision sciences, including modeling and simulation, have 
evolved to the point where defining the tradeoff space and making informed choices 
within it can now be done with greater confidence; and we are obliged to use state-of-the-
art methodology to assist with difficult decisions. In short, it is through tradeoff analysis 
and cost-benefit analysis that we begin building value chains. While we cannot become 
obsessed with efficiency at the expense of effectiveness in a variety of risk environments, 
whenever practicable we must insist that all technology, processes and procedures still 
"buy" their way into the organization in terms of reducing the total cost of doing 
business. There is merit in creating mechanisms for scanning the environment in the 
interest of identifying best practices before imposing what may turn out to be premature 
procrustean solutions. 
  
IDENTIFING WHAT IS IMPORTANT 
Re-engineering should begin with the identification of what is important, because if you 
don't know where you are going, any road will take you there. To assist us in this vital 
undertaking, we need to heed the counsel of a brilliant mathematician, economist and 
sociologist, Vilfredo Pareto, who observed some time ago that many phenomena are 
distributed in accordance with the 80:20 rule; a discovery as significant as Gauss's normal 
distribution. The 80:20 rule applies to sales, profits, problems, management activities, 
organizational goals, etc. Frequently, 80 percent of sales come from 20 percent of the 
customers; 80 percent of the profits from 20 percent of the product line, 80 percent of the 
problems from 20 percent of the employees, and so forth. Unfortunately, many, if not 
most organizations, devote 80 percent of their time, effort, and money to the 80 percent 
that does not matter very much instead of the 20 percent that makes most of the 
difference (Kreitner, 1995). 
In the inventory management sphere, Pareto's 80:20 rule is known as "ABC analysis." 
Since typically about 20 percent of the items account for 80 percent of the cost or activity 
(and 5 percent of the inventory is often responsible for half of the cost or activity), these 
items receive special attention. The remaining 80 percent are handled in a routine manner 
(Muczyk, 1997). 
With respect to planning, the 20 percent of the most important goals are called "breakout" 
goals. It is the attainment of "breakout" goals that provides the quantum leap to the next 
plateau of an organization's vision. Pareto's 80:20 rule is also instructive for Ministries 
that have oversight responsibilities for certain private sector industries. The decision rule 
may go something like this: Manage the most important 20 percent of activities, track the 
next 30 percent, and forget the rest. In other words, pay careful attention to what is most 
important and focus on results, not the means for obtaining the results. 
  
CONTINUALLY IMPROVING AND REFINING SPECIFIC MANAGEMENT 
PRACTICES AND PROCEDURES 
It has been estimated that 30 percent of private sector workers' time is wasted because of 
work scheduling problems alone. The situation is probably exacerbated in the public 
sector because vigilance with respect to best practices is a survival imperative in a 
competitive environment, whereas efficiency is an option in the absence of competition. 
Consequently, preserving best business practices in their original form is a continuous 
challenge that requires unrelenting management attention. After all, how can employees 
take their jobs seriously when they observe on a daily basis management's indifference to 
inefficiency? The Japanese call this process "Kaizen," which means improving the 
overall system by constantly improving details (Muczyk and Hastings, 1985). In order to 
clarify shared tasks between departments, organizations should consider such aides as: 
the responsibility chart; process management and cross-functional teams. Important ideas 
frequently lead to significant consequences. We can initiate the chain reaction by sending 
key employees to quality, focused training and educational programs for cutting-edge 
ideas and best business practices (Davis, 1991). 
  
RETHINKING THE ROLE AND SIZE OF STAFF DEPARTMENTS 
The purpose of staff departments is to serve line departments, not the other way around. 
F. Kenneth Iverson, president and CEO of Nucor Corp., the most successful steel firm in 
the United States, takes the following position vis-à-vis staff departments: "We keep our 
people at our plants where the day-to-day decisions are made. There is no need for a large 
support staff." (Muczyk and Hastings, 1985) Benchmarking "best-in-class" private sector 
corporations, such as Nucor, and emulating their best practices is a constructive way of 
improving efficiency and effectiveness. 
Managers should abandon the habit of using staff departments as their eyes and ears. 
Once staff personnel become perceived by other organizational members as the 
"Organizational Gestapo," they will no longer be viewed as a valuable source of help, 
thereby negating their most important potential contribution, which is advice, counsel and 
assistance. Equally important, the organization will not need as many staff personnel if 
they are not used as an integral part of the organizational control system. Some private 
sector organizations require staff departments to charge internal users directly for the 
services they receive. Under this arrangement, a staff department is expected to recover 
its own operating costs by billing other organizational units for services rendered. Since 
staff departments must live within their budgets, they must downsize if their services are 
not used enough. Such a scheme works even better if organizational units possess the 
option to purchase services on the open market, if they receive better value (Davis, 1991). 
  
DE-LAYERING HIERARCHIES 
Bureaucratic organizations subscribe to the classical management principle of narrow 
span of control, which states that managers above the first level of supervision should 
restrict themselves to four-to-eight subordinates (lower-level managers). Such a span of 
management forces a tall organizational structure with many layers of management. The 
importance of position in the bureaucratic structure exacerbates the tendency to build 
organizations with unnecessary levels of management (Muczyk & Hastings, 1985). 
At well-run organizations, such as Nucor, there are only five levels of workers - 
president, seven vice presidents, department managers, supervisors and workers. While 
tall organizational structures afford more promotional opportunities and more time 
available to each subordinate from the superior, the price to be paid for these positive 
features is excessive, not the least of which are the cost associated with unnecessary 
managers, distortion of information and the slow response to change. Furthermore, 
reducing management layers by broadening the span of control forces decision making 
down to the lowest levels that possess the expertise to make them, thereby empowering 
the workforce. After all, it is through empowerment that many employees become 
enthusiastic stakeholders in the organization's mission and goals, and it is the same 




EMPLOYING NETWORK ORGANIZATIONS 
Wherever practical, functions currently performed by government agencies should be 
privatized or outsourced to the private sector, since the private sector is usually more 
efficient. Moreover, as has already been discussed, downsizing government ministries in 
developing nations should reduce bureaucratic impediments. Toward that end, the 
concept of network organizations should be employed. Network organizations differ from 
previous organizational structures in the following ways: 
-- Network organizations define their core competence and contract the remaining 
functions. That is, they use the combined assets of several firms located at various points 
along the value chain. 
-- Network organizations place greater reliance on market mechanisms than 
administrative processes to regulate resource flows. These are not, however, "at arm's 
length" relationships. The interdependence, in fact, resembles the Japanese "keiretsu." 
-- Network organizations expect a proactive role among participants that enhances the 
final product or service rather than just fulfilling a contract to the letter. Those members 
of the network that are reluctant to go the extra mile lose their position (Miles & Snow, 
1992). 
  
REWARDING WHAT IS IMPORTANT 
Working hard and smart is not part of the human condition. The path of least resistance 
is. However, most employees will concentrate on those activities and outcomes that are 
measured and rewarded. If an organization is serious about reducing bureaucracy, it must 
measure the important activities and outcomes, and reward in a significant way those 
individuals who perform them well. The best way to preserve the status quo is to measure 
everything, as is frequently done by bureaucratic organizations, and to reward all 
outcomes and activities the same. Clearly, Pareto's 80:20 rule is a very useful guide in 
this respect (Muczyk, 1988). 
CONCLUSION 
In the absence of competition, organizations, private and public, will become bloated, 
inefficient bureaucracies. In the presence of vigorous competition, organizations either 
slim down in a hurry and at the same time adopt the best global business practices, or go 
out of business. Hence, whenever possible, it is recommended that activities currently 
performed by government organizations be exposed to the rigors of the marketplace 
through privatization or outsourcing. At the same time, public policy should encourage 
maximum competition in the private sector. Also, without competition, introducing 
technology will not improve efficiency because the impetus to reduce superfluous 
employees is missing. Hence, the technology will merely duplicate what the workers 
have done all along, since they are still there and in need of keeping busy. In those 
instances where the preferred solution is not available, recommendations have been 
presented for streamlining organizations in the interest of efficiency, without sacrificing 
effectiveness. Both strategies need to be pursued aggressively to do the job properly. 
We are living in a world when technological change is occurring at a faster pace than 
ever before, and the rate of change is increasing. Hence, once intense competition 
emerges, redundant production and clerical workers are replaced first by technology. But 
in subsequent rounds, more advanced technology is substituted for middle managers and 
staff professionals. Competition gives firms little choice if they wish to survive. In other 
words, those economies that will prosper in the future are the ones that will be able to re-
invent themselves periodically through a process that Schumpeter called "creative 
destruction." This re-invention, however, requires foreign direct investment as well as 
investment by nationals, and de-bureaucratization facilitates both. Only time will tell 
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